The Cartaz along the Canara Coast: How 16th-Century Portuguese Naval Monopolies Fueled the Ullal Resistance

In local memory across coastal Karnataka, the 16th-century conflicts between the principality of Ullal and the Estado da Índia (State of India, the Portuguese colonial administration) are framed around the martial resolve of Rani Abbakka Chowta. Popular narratives highlight her tactical night attacks and defenses of coastal strongholds. Yet maritime customs records and colonial archives reveal a structural economic catalyst behind these encounters: the cartaz (written pass) system enforced by Portuguese naval patrols to monopolize high-value sea routes.

The Chowta dynasty governed a modest realm in Tulu Nadu, operating from an inland capital at Puttige alongside the vital estuarine port of Ullal. Succession followed aliya santana (matrilineal inheritance passing to a sister's son or daughter). Positioned just south of Mangalore, Ullal sat directly along the littoral trade corridor connecting the spice-producing hinterlands of South Canara to the broader Arabian Sea.

The Architecture of the Cartaz

Following Vasco da Gama's arrival at Calicut in 1498, the Portuguese Crown moved to assert maritime sovereignty through coercive administrative regulation. Rather than controlling production inland, the Estado da Índia sought to control the sea lanes using the cartaz—a mandatory sea-pass derived from the Arabic qirtas (paper or document).

Under this framework, every non-Portuguese merchant vessel operating in the Indian Ocean was required to purchase a cartaz from a Portuguese customs house, such as those established after Lopo Vaz de Sampaio set up factories in Mangalore in 1526. The document outlined specific routing requirements, mandating that ships call at designated Portuguese-controlled ports to pay customs duties (alfândega). Crucially, the pass prohibited merchant ships from transporting specific imperial monopoly commodities—most notably Malabar pepper (Piper nigrum) and weapon stores. Vessels caught without a valid pass were subject to immediate seizure, confiscation of cargo, and the capture or execution of their crew.

For the merchants of the Canara coast, these terms dismantled established trade networks. Ports like Ullal had built their wealth by exporting regional rice, timber, and pepper to the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Malabar coast. Enforcing the cartaz aimed to divert this traffic through Goa or Portuguese-controlled customs points, stripping local rulers of customs revenue and placing traditional merchant networks under foreign oversight.

The Canara-Malabar Trade Nexus

Ullal was not an isolated coastal outpost. It functioned as an entry port for the inland pepper harvest and as a primary granary for the Malabar region. Malabar, heavy on spice production, relied on coastal grain shipments arriving on light, maneuverable vessels. Portuguese records document frequent skirmishes triggered by efforts to stifle these rice exports from Ullal to Malabar.

To protect this trade, Ullal forged a strategic alignment with the Zamorin of Calicut and the Mappila (Malabar Muslim) merchant fleets. Commanders like Kutty Pokar Markar, acting on behalf of the Zamorin's naval apparatus, coordinated with Ullal's forces. The coalition combined small, fast coastal craft with shore-based artillery to slip past Portuguese blockades, often moving goods without purchasing a cartaz.

When the Portuguese captured an Ullal merchant ship at sea for failing to present a pass, the economic dispute escalated into direct military conflict. The clash was not merely over territorial control, but over who possessed the authority to grant freedom of movement along the coastal lanes.

Escalate and Repel: 1555–1568

Portuguese colonial documentation records a series of expeditions dispatched from Goa to subdue Ullal and enforce compliance with imperial customs rules. In 1555, the Estado da Índia sent Admiral Dom Álvaro da Silveira to demand tax payments and full subjection to the cartaz regulatory regime. The expedition ended in a tactical defeat for the Portuguese forces.

Subsequent campaigns followed as the Portuguese sought to secure their southern flank. In 1567, Portuguese forces attacked Mangalore and fortified their presence across the river estuary, attempting to cut off Ullal's access to international sea routes. The following year, in 1568, a larger expedition commanded by João Peixoto took control of Ullal town. Contemporary accounts record that local forces launched a swift counter-offensive, killing Peixoto and driving the Portuguese garrison back to their ships.

These engagements demonstrate the limits of the cartaz system when confronted by coordinated littoral defense. While the Portuguese held superior heavy naval artillery on open waters, their draft restricted deep access into estuarine shallow waters. Coastal defense forces utilized low-slung vessels suited for river mouths and narrow channels, disrupting Portuguese attempts to establish permanent blockade stations.

The Numismatic and Administrative Balance

The conflict along the Canara coast highlights the economic realities of 16th-century Indian Ocean commerce. Modern historiography often frames early European presence in Asia as immediate oceanic dominance, but regional records depict an ongoing struggle over maritime taxation.

The Portuguese reliance on the cartaz was itself a recognition of limited inland power. Unable to control pepper production at its source in the Western Ghats, the Estado da Índia attempted to tax the transit points. Local principalities like Ullal demonstrated that by maintaining flexible alliances across regional religious and merchant groups—including Jains, Hindus, and Mappila Muslims—littoral states could resist external trade monopolies for decades.

The historical sequence of the Ullal–Portuguese conflicts serves as an example of how administrative mechanisms of trade control directly shaped regional warfare along the early modern Indian Ocean seaboard.